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Abstract
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries is often associated with higher eco-
nomic growth due to knowledge and technology spillovers to local ﬁrms. One way how FDI
speeds up growth is that it facilitates the manufacturing of more sophisticated products by lo-
cal ﬁrms. So far, ﬁrm-level evidence is missing on how the presence of multinational ﬁrms
affects the product sophistication of ﬁrms in a developing country. This paper aims to ﬁll this
gap. We compile an extensive ﬁrm-product-level dataset of Indian manufacturing ﬁrms which
we complement with information on product sophistication and spillovers from FDI. We then
explore different channels through which spillovers from multinationals to local Indian ﬁrms
foster the manufacturing of sophisticated products. We ﬁnd evidence that spillovers through
supplier linkages strongly increase the manufacturing of sophisticated products in India.
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1 Introduction
Politicians give high priority to attracting FDI in developing countries. In India, e.g., foreign
investors enjoy tax holidays up to 100% (UNCTAD, 2000) and are entitled to additional depre-
ciation of 20% on new investments (Parekh, Shah, Khivasara, and Dholakia, 2012). According
to estimates of the Indian Ministry of Finance (2013), the revenue foregone due to accelerated
depreciation adds up to about 5 billion USD in 2011–12. The main argument in favor of gener-
ous ﬁscal incentives to foreign investors usually is that FDI spurs economic development in the
host country. Foreign investors not only inject fresh capital but also bring new knowledge and
technologies which can spill over to host country ﬁrms. One way how FDI speeds up growth is
that it facilitates the manufacturing of more sophisticated, i.e. technologically advanced, prod-
ucts by local ﬁrms. Country-level evidence from China and India also suggests that FDI is a
major driver of technological upgrading and economic growth (Woo, 2012).
At the ﬁrm-level, an extensive body of literature analyzes how spillovers from FDI affect the
productivity, export, and wage setting decisions of host country ﬁrms (Görg and Greenaway,
2004). However, little is known on how the presence of multinational enterprises (MNEs)
affects the manufacturing of sophisticated products by ﬁrms. This is surprising given that tech-
nological upgrading through FDI is considered an important source of growth in developing
countries. The main contribution of this paper is to explore this particular spillover channel in
order to provide micro-level evidence on how technological upgrading can be achieved. For
a sample of Indian manufacturing ﬁrms, we empirically investigate how spillovers from FDI
inﬂuence the product sophistication of ﬁrms. Due to our rich dataset, we can differentiate be-
tween horizontal and vertical transmission channels for spillovers. This allows us to identify
industries in which the attraction of FDI is particularly beneﬁcial. Our results suggest that the
presence of multinational downstream ﬁrms increases the product sophistication of local Indian
ﬁrms via vertical backward linkages. In contrast, a higher presence of multinational upstream
ﬁrms can have an adverse effect on product sophistication via vertical forward linkages. We do
not ﬁnd robust evidence of positive horizontal spillovers.
India is an appropriate setting to tackle our research question. India’s economy was liberalized
during the 1980s and 1990s by, among others, dismantling the License Raj system that regulated
entry and production activity in the registered manufacturing sector (Aghion, Burgess, Redding,
and Zilibotti, 2008). As a consequence, India experienced high growth rates and large inﬂows
of FDI over the past few years. Figure 1 shows that FDI as a percentage of total GDP has
steadily increased up to almost 4% by 2008 in India. Total GDP annually grew between 4 and
10%. Therefore, insights on the relationship between FDI and technological upgrading from a
large growing market can also be interesting for other developing economies.
To investigate the impact of FDI on product sophistication at the ﬁrm-level, we combine
data from three different sources. Data on Indian manufacturing ﬁrms come from the Prowess
database. Prowess collects annual data on the ﬁnancial performance of publicly listed and
unlisted Indian ﬁrms. Most importantly, it also reports detailed information on the products
manufactured by each ﬁrm. Moreover, we employ data on the industry-wise sale and purchase
1
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relationships from the OECD (2012) input-output tables for India to construct spillover mea-
sures at the industry-level. Horizontal spillovers are proxied by the intensity of contact between
local ﬁrms and MNEs within an industry. Vertical spillovers are captured by the intensity of
contact between local ﬁrms and MNEs across industries. Finally, we exploit disaggregated data
on country-level export ﬂows from CEPII-BACI to obtain a product-speciﬁc sophistication in-
dex which was developed in Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007). The idea of the index is to
proxy the technology level of a product by the average technology level (GDP per capita) that
a country needs to have in order to successfully export a particular product. Thus, a product is
more sophisticated if it is exported by richer countries.
0
2
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1
0
%
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
FDI/GDP GDP Growth
Source: World Bank Development Indicator Database.
Figure 1: FDI inﬂow as share of GDP and annual GDP growth in India
For our analysis, we consider two dimensions of product sophistication at the ﬁrm-level. Our
ﬁrst measure is a dummy variable indicating whether a ﬁrm manufactures at least one product
belonging to the top quartile of the sophistication distribution. Thereby, we capture the manu-
facturing of highly sophisticated products (HSPs) by ﬁrms. Second, we measure the extent of
ﬁrm-level product sophistication by calculating the average sophistication level of all products
manufactured by a ﬁrm. In the empirical analysis, we regress each measure of ﬁrm-product
sophistication on the proxies for horizontal and vertical FDI spillovers. We use a ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects approach to control for unobserved inﬂuences on the ﬁrm-level. Our ﬁndings suggest
the existence of strong positive spillovers through vertical backward linkages. An increase in
backward spillovers by 10 percentage points raises the probability that a ﬁrm manufactures an
HSP by about 4% and increases average ﬁrm-product sophistication by 16%. In contrast, we
do not ﬁnd evidence of signiﬁcant horizontal spillovers. These ﬁndings support the idea that
MNEs try to prevent technology leakage to competitors, but have an incentive to transfer their
knowledge to suppliers. Finally, we observe that the presence of multinational upstream ﬁrms
induces a strong negative effect on ﬁrm product sophistication. An increase by 10 percentage
points in forward linkages reduces a ﬁrm’s probability to manufacture an HSP by about 13%
2
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and decreases average product sophistication by about 32%. One explanation for this ﬁnding is
that the technology gap between foreign inputs and local ﬁnal goods is too large so that Indian
ﬁrms cannot make use of foreign inputs and are driven out of the production of highly sophis-
ticated ﬁnal goods. The negative effect of forward linkages is less strong for more productive
Indian ﬁrms, though. This indicates that more productive ﬁrms are better able to use inputs from
MNE’s, since the technology gap is smaller for them. Overall, we ﬁnd the spillover effects to
be particularly strong for domestic ﬁrms without foreign ownership participation.
This paper is related to two different strands of literature. First, it builds on the literature on
product sophistication and economic development. According to the models by Stokey (1988)
and Young (1991), the production of sophisticated goods sets free knowledge and learning-by-
doing spillovers which spur economic growth. The spillovers are the stronger the more sophis-
ticated the goods are. Consequently, enduring growth requires the introduction of increasingly
sophisticated products. Hausmann et al. (2007) develop a model in which the production of
highly sophisticated products shifts out the technological frontier of a country and thus spurs
growth. They also provide cross-country evidence on the positive impact of product sophisti-
cation on growth in developing countries. Jarreau and Poncet (2012) conﬁrm the relationship
between product sophistication and growth for Chinese provinces. Our study complements the
literature by providing micro-level evidence on the manufacturing of sophisticated products.
We are aware of only one study by Hunt and Tybout (1998) that portrays the manufacturing
of sophisticated products by Colombian and Moroccan plants. This study, however, uses the
number of technicians employed by a plant to proxy for ﬁrm-level product sophistication. We,
instead, directly infer the sophistication level of a product. Our measure of product sophistica-
tion reﬂects differences in technological requirements of products and is thus unrelated to ﬁrm
characteristics.
Second, we relate to the literature on spillovers from FDI. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and
Markusen and Venables (1999) provide a theoretical foundation for the impact of MNEs on
host country development. In both models, ﬁrm productivity and host country welfare improve
if MNEs create strong backward linkages with host country ﬁrms. Lin and Saggi (2007) and
Carluccio and Fally (2013) show that a vertical technology transfer can also entail adverse wel-
fare effects if it is directed to only a subgroup of local suppliers. In Lin and Saggi (2007),
exclusive contracts between MNEs and local suppliers prevent that technology transfers beneﬁt
all suppliers. Carluccio and Fally (2013) account for ﬁrm heterogeneity and show that only
the most productive ﬁrms are able to adopt foreign technologies when technology adoption is
costly. Liu (2008) differentiates between short-term level effects and long-term growth effects.
In his model, FDI spillovers reduce productivity levels in the short term due to a reallocation
of ressources but in the long run, productivity growth increases. A large part of the empirical
literature focuses on the impact of FDI on ﬁrm-level outcomes such as productivity. Evidence
on productivity gains through contact to multinational ﬁrms remains ambiguous and critically
hinges on the data available.1 An early investigation is Caves (1974) who observes positive
horizontal spillovers for Australian ﬁrms. Other studies that only consider horizontal spillovers
1 See Görg and Strobl (2001) for a meta-analysis on the subject.
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from FDI often ﬁnd negative or insigniﬁcant effects on the productivity of domestic ﬁrms (e.g.
Harrison and Aitken (1999) for Venezuelan ﬁrms and Konings (2001) for Romania, Bulgaria,
and Poland). One exemption is Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2007), who observe a positive
relationship between the presence of MNEs and total factor productivity growth of UK ﬁrms.
Schoors and Van Der Tol (2002), Javorcik (2004), Blalock and Gertler (2008), Lin et al. (2009),
and Liu (2008) differentiate between horizontal and vertical FDI spillovers and provide evi-
dence of positive spillovers via backward linkages in Hungary, Lithuania, Indonesia, and China,
respectively.2 The only study that addresses the effect of FDI on product sophistication does so
at the product-country level. For a sample of 105 countries, Harding and Javorcik (2012) ﬁnd
that the unit values of export products increase if these products belong to sectors targeted by
FDI promotion. However, with their cross-country empirical setup with disaggregated interna-
tional export data they fail to ﬁnd the same effect if product sophistication is measured via the
Hausmann et al. (2007) index.
Our analysis contributes by providing evidence on a further micro-level channel through
which FDI promotes economic growth. We show that the presence of multi-national ﬁrms
not only allows local ﬁrms to become more efﬁcient or upgrade the quality of their products,
but that it also helps ﬁrms to produce more technologically advanced products. This is in line
with the macroeconomic evidence by Woo (2012) who shows that FDI is an important driver of
technological upgrading in China and India.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on how
spillovers from FDI inﬂuence ﬁrm product sophistication through different linkages. Section 3
describes the data. In Section 4, we portray product sophistication of Indian ﬁrms. Section 5
discusses our empirical strategy and presents the corresponding results. Section 6 concludes.
2 For an extensive overview of the empirical evidence on FDI spillover effects at the ﬁrm-level, refer to Görg and
Greenaway (2004).
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2 Potential channels of FDI spillovers and their effect on product
sophistication
To guide our empirical analysis, we elaborate on the potential channels through which spillovers
from FDI can inﬂuence product sophistication of ﬁrms. Our discussion relies on the theoret-
ical framework by Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) that describes the production choice of an
entrepreneur. In the model, entrepreneurs can choose whether to invest in the production of a
traditional sector good or a modern, technology intensive sector good. The traditional sector
consists of a homogeneous good whose cost of production is commonly known. The mod-
ern sector consists of differentiated goods, each of which requires the adoption of a particular
technology that is already used in developed countries. The cost of producing a modern sector
good is discovered only after production. Uncertainty about the production cost of a modern
sector good stems from the technology of the modern sector good which is unknown to the
entrepreneur. Moreover, she may have to make certain changes in order to establish the product
in the local market, for example adjustments due to different raw materials or the introduction
of additional quality controls. Thus, the entrepreneur has to engage in a costly learning process
to discover whether she is able to successfully produce and market the good. If the new product
is introduced successfully into the economy, it is prone to emulation from other entrepreneurs.3
This reduces the proﬁtability to the original entrepreneur. Brieﬂy, the returns from introducing
a more sophisticated good cannot completely be internalized by an entrepreneur whereas she
bears the full costs of the new investment. Consequently, entrepreneurs may choose too little
investment in more sophisticated goods.
The presence of MNEs in developing countries can impact on a ﬁrm’s choice whether to
manufacture a more sophisticated product. FDI changes the access to foreign knowledge and
technologies since MNEs usually employ more advanced technlogies and have already engaged
in the cost discovery process of new products (Harding and Javorcik, 2012). If knowledge on
the use of more sophisticated technologies spills over to local ﬁrms, cost uncertainty is reduced
and the production of more technologically advanced products is facilitated.
Spillovers from MNEs to local ﬁrms can evolve through three different channels. First,
spillovers can ﬂow from multinationals to local ﬁrms within the same industry. Well-cited
examples for positive horizontal spillovers are learning-by-observation and worker turnover.
Local ﬁrms learn how to produce a more sophisticated product by simply observing the pro-
duction techniques of MNEs in the same industry. Furthermore, workers that have previously
been employed by multinationals can transfer their acquired knowledge when switching to a
local ﬁrm. The effect of horizontal spillovers is limited, though, since MNEs have an incentive
to prevent technology leakage via patenting their technologies or via paying higher wages to
limit the knowledge outﬂow. Within-industry presence of multinationals can also lead to a neg-
ative competition effect on local ﬁrms. MNEs are usually assumed to be more skill-intensive
3 Emulation is justiﬁed by the assumption that the original entrepreneur is not able to secure her adoption of
the modern good via patents since the adjustment usually is too small to receive patent protection (Evenson and
Westphal, 1995).
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and more productive than local ﬁrms and thus they are better able to produce more sophisti-
cated goods. Consequently, competition can crowd out local ﬁrms from the production of more
sophisticated products.
Second, vertical backward spillovers can occur between multinational downstream ﬁrms and
local upstream ﬁrms via supplier linkages. Even though preventing technology leakage is
preferable within the own industry, MNEs have an incentive to transfer their knowledge to
local suppliers.4 Consider for example an Indian steel manufacturer that is selling steel bars
for the use in water pumps. An MNE engaging in the construction of airplane wings requires
ﬂat rolled steel sheets instead. Producing steel sheets is more technologically advanced since it
requires the handling of special steel rolling machines. In order to source the ﬂat steel sheets
locally, the multinational company can provide training services to suppliers on how to use the
speciﬁc machines and on how to combine existing production techniques. The magnitude of
the effect of backward spillovers depends on the extent to which multinationals source locally.
If inputs are predominantly acquired from abroad, positive backward spillovers are limited in
size (Javorcik, 2008).
Third, knowledge spillovers can ﬂow from multinational suppliers to local customers via
vertical forward linkages. Access to highly sophisticated inputs from MNEs allows local down-
stream ﬁrms to produce highly sophisticated outputs. Flat steel sheets can only be produced if
the speciﬁc rolling machines are available to Indian ﬁrms. In addition, multinational upstream
ﬁrms can provide training to downstream customers on how to use the machines. However, as
Javorcik (2008) notes, the effect of positive forward spillovers depends on the availability of
sophisticated inputs prior to the entry of multinational downstream ﬁrms. If highly sophisti-
cated inputs are accessible via imports, forward spillovers are limited in size. Moreover, the
technological gap between local and multinational ﬁrms plays a decisive role. If the technolog-
ical gap is too large, local ﬁrms cannot make use of inputs provided by multinationals in their
production process. This can also entail a negative effect if local inputs are crowded out by
multinational inputs and local ﬁnal good producers no longer have access to suitable inputs (see
e.g. Carluccio and Fally, 2013).
4 See for example Lin and Saggi (2007) or Pack and Saggi (2001) for a theoretical framework on vertical
technology transfer by MNEs.
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3 Data and summary statistics
In order to conduct our empirical analysis we combine three datasets. Data on Indian manu-
facturing ﬁrms come from the Prowess database. To construct the spillover measures, we use
data on the industry-wise sale and purchase relationships from the OECD (2012) input-output
tables for India. Finally, we exploit disaggregated data on country-level export ﬂows from
CEPII-BACI to calculate the product sophistication index.
3.1 Firm-level data – Prowess
The Prowess database is compiled by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE)
and provides ﬁrm-level information on listed and unlisted Indian enterprises.5 The database
performs quite well in terms of comprehensiveness. According to CMIE, the output of manu-
facturing ﬁrms covered in the database accounts for about 80% of total Indian manufacturing
output. Identity indicators comprise inter alia the incorporation year, the ownership type, the
share of equity held by foreign investors, and the place of business. The industry classiﬁca-
tion is based on ISIC Rev.4 up to the 4-digit level. Data on ﬁnancial statements include total
sales, exports, the wage bill, total assets, and raw material expenditures. One drawback is that
information on the number of employees per ﬁrm is available for very few ﬁrms only. Essential
for our analysis is that Prowess provides information on the products manufactured by Indian
ﬁrms. Due to the 1956 Companies Act, Indian ﬁrms have to make information available on the
sales, capacities, and production quantities of their products.
We compile a ﬁrm-level panel data set of 5,539 manufacturing ﬁrms for the period 2001 to
2010. We choose 2001 as a start year since data on the equity capital held by foreign investors is
available only from 2001 onwards. The panel is unbalanced and the number of ﬁrms observed
in each year ranges between 3,000 and 4,000. The total number of ﬁrm-year observations
amounts to 36,238. On average, a ﬁrm is present in the dataset for 7 out of 10 years. A list
of all variables included throughout the analysis can be found in Table 1. Table 2 provides
average ﬁrm characteristics for the entire sample period. Data on income and expenditures
are in million Rupees and deﬂated by either the Indian industry speciﬁc wholesale price index
(sales and exports) or the Indian overall wholesale price index (all other) following Goldberg,
Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2010). The average ﬁrm age is 25 years and ﬁrms produce
3 products on average.6
Information on exports is only available for ﬁrms that export a positive amount (18,209 ﬁrm-
year observations). More than 90% of all ﬁrms are privately Indian owned, about 6% are
foreign-owned and the remaining part is state owned.7 For publicly listed companies, Prowess
5 The Prowess database has already been used in various research projects. See for example Goldberg, Khan-
delwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2009) for evidence on how trade liberalization affects the import of new inputs
by Indian ﬁrms or Franco and Sasidharan (2010) for evidence of FDI spillovers on the export participation of
Indian ﬁrms.
6 For an in-depth discussion about Indian multi-product ﬁrms and their characterstics, we refer to Goldberg et al.
(2010) who provide a detailed portrait on multi-product ﬁrms from the Prowess database.
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provides the share of equity held by foreign investors which is on average 6%. We perform a
consistency check on ownership information by comparing the ownership type, as indicated by
Prowess, with the share of equity held by foreign investors. For government and Indian owned
listed ﬁrms, the average share of equity held by foreigners is below 10% and for listed ﬁrms
classiﬁed as foreign-owned, the average share lies above 50% (data not reported in Table 2).
LogTFP denotes ﬁrm total factor productivity and is calculated using the superlative index
number approach (Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982), Grifﬁth, Redding, and Simpson,
2009). For further details on the calculation of the productivity measure please refer to the
appendix.8
Table 1: Description of variables
Outcome variables
HSP Dummy equal to 1 if ﬁrm produces at least one product from the top quartile of the
sophistication distribution and 0 otherwise
LogEXS Log average product sophistication level of ﬁrm
Spillover measures
Horizontal Extent of presence of multinational companies in own industry
Backward Extent of presence of multinational companies in downstream industries
Forward Extent of presence of multinational companies in upstream industries
Other variables
ForeignOwned Dummy equal to 1 if ﬁrm is owned by a foreign entity and 0 otherwise
ForeignShare Share of equity held by foreign investors
HHI Herﬁndahl index of industry concentration
LogAge Log age of ﬁrm
LiqRatio Liquidity ratio of ﬁrm, deﬁned as current assets less current liabilities over total assets
LogIncome Log of total income of a ﬁrm
LogTFP Log total factor productivity of ﬁrm based on the superlative index number approach
(Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) and Griﬃth, Redding, and Simpson, 2009)
Variables used in the calculation of LogTFP
LogGroFixAss Log gross ﬁxed assets of ﬁrm
LogRawMatExp Log raw material expenditures of ﬁrm
LogSales Log sales of ﬁrm
LogWagebill Log wage bill of ﬁrm
7 Prowess makes use of internal information to classify ﬁrms according to their ownership status, but does not
provide further information on the classiﬁcation system.
8 We also experimented with a semi-parametric productivity measure obtained via the Levinsohn-Petrin algo-
rithm (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) that corrects for endogeneity in the ﬁrm’s choice of production inputs due to
unobserved shocks. Our main results remain unchanged when we use a more sophisticated measure of productiv-
ity. However, the Levinsohn-Petrin measure is more data-demanding and relies on the assumption that there is no
entry and exit of ﬁrms. Since our panel is unbalanced, we decided to use the superlative index number approach.
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Table 2: Summary statistics, 2001 – 2010
snoitavresbO.veD.dtSnaeMelbairaV
832,6338.7122.52egA
832,6300.243.2stcudorpforebmuN
902,8160.8678.5stropxE
832,6316.30374.053IHH
981,6323.042.0oitaRqiL
832,6318.143.0ssAxiForGgoL
832,6398.179.0emocnIgoL
832,6341.240.0pxEtaMwaRgoL
832,6329.160.1selaSgoL
832,639.111.0–PFTgoL
832,6348.181.2–llibegaWgoL
832,6392.09.0)%(denwonaidnIylatevirP
832,6342.060.0)%(denwOngieroF
832,6381.030.0)%(denwOetatS
873,5178.613.6)%(erahsytiuqengieroF
Sales, the wage bill, gross ﬁxed assets, raw material expenses, and exports are in million Rupees. Sales and the
export volume are deﬂated by the Indian industry speciﬁc wholesale price index and all other monetary values
are deﬂated by the Indian overall wholesale price index.
3.2 Industry linkages – OECD input-output tables
We use data from the OECD (2012) input-output tables for India to construct measures of FDI
linkages. The input-output tables describe economy-wide consumption and supply relationships
between producers and consumers. For India, data are available for two time periods, the early
2000 and the mid 2000 period.
We follow Javorcik (2004) in constructing proxies for horizontal and vertical spillovers from
FDI. Horizontal spillovers within each industry are deﬁned as
Horizontaljt =
[∑
i,i∈j
ForeignShareit ∗ Yit
]
/
∑
i,i∈j
Yit. (1)
ForeignShareit is the percentage of equity held by foreign investors in ﬁrm i at time t and Yit
denotes the total sales of the ﬁrm. Horizontaljt, thus, is the sales weighted average of foreign
equity held in industry j at time t. It proxies spillovers from the intensity of contact between
foreign investors and local ﬁrms in industry j. Foreign presence in industry j rises if the average
foreign equity share in the industry or the output of ﬁrms with foreign participation increases.
Vertical backward spillovers stem from the intensity of contacts between suppliers and multi-
national customers in downstream industries. They are proxied by the degree of foreign pres-
ence in industries to which ﬁrms in industry j supply. Backwardjt is deﬁned as
Backwardjt =
∑
k,k =j
αjk ∗Horizontalkt, (2)
where αjk denotes the share of output of industry j that is supplied to industry k and is cal-
culated from the OECD input-output tables for India. Following Javorcik (2004), we calculate
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αjk excluding output of industry j that is used for ﬁnal consumption but including interme-
diate products. Moreover, the within-industry supply share αjj is not included in (2) since
within-industry spillover effects are already taken up by Horizontaljt. Increases in backward
spillovers to industry j can stem from a rise in relative supply to downstream industries with
foreign presence or from a rise in foreign presence in downstream industries.
Last but not least, vertical forward spillovers originate from the contact between local down-
stream ﬁrms and multinational suppliers in upstream industries. They are proxied by the degree
of foreign presence in industries from which industry j consumes inputs. Forwardjt is deﬁned
as
Forwardjt =
∑
m,m =j
σjm
⎡
⎣
[∑
i,i∈m ForeignShareit ∗ (Yit −Xit)
]
[∑
i,i∈m(Yit −Xit)
]
⎤
⎦ , (3)
where σjm is the share of inputs that industry j consumes from industry m. The within-industry
consumption share σjj is not included in (3). Firm-level exports Xit have to be subtracted
from ﬁrm-level output since exports cannot be consumed by industry j. Forward spillovers
to industry j increase if relative consumption from industries with foreign presence rises or if
foreign presence in upstream industries rises.
Three remarks on the calculation of the FDI linkage measures are in order. First, note that we
use the industry-wise supply and consumption shares from the early (mid) 2000 period to con-
struct our spillover variables for the years 2001 to 2005 (2006 to 2010). Our spillover measures
vary at the industry-year level because ﬁrm-year speciﬁc information on ForeignShareit, Yit,
andXit is added. Second, since the OECD input-output tables are based on ISIC Rev.3, we con-
vert the 24 2-digit manufacturing industries at ISIC Rev.4 in Prowess to the corresponding ISIC
Rev.3 categories.9 Table A.1 in the appendix provides the correspondence between both clas-
siﬁcations and the share of ﬁrms in each industry. Third, data on ForeignShareit, the equity
participation by foreign investors, is available for publicly listed ﬁrms only (16,452 ﬁrm-year
observations). If we use information from publicly listed ﬁrms only, we disregard almost two
thirds of our observations. In order to calculate consistent spillover measures, we supplement
ForeignShareit by information on the ownership type of ﬁrms as deﬁned by Prowess. We
consider ﬁrms that are classiﬁed as privately Indian or government owned to have 0% foreign
equity and privately foreign-owned ﬁrms to have 100% foreign equity. We provide a robustness
check of our main results with regard to this assumption.
Table 3 reports summary statistics on the share of foreign equity in each industry and the
spillover measures for the year 2010. Our measures strongly vary across industries. The average
share of foreign equity held in ﬁrms is highest in the motor vehicles industry (34.6%) and lowest
in the textile industry (1.3%). If we weigh foreign equity held in each industry by output, the
ranking is slightly different. Horizontal spillovers are highest in the motor vehicles industry
and lowest in manufacturing and recycling. Backward spillovers are comparatively smaller in
9 The rather high aggregation level of industries is due to data constraints when matching the Indian and the
OECD data. This makes it harder to trace signiﬁcant spillover effects and therefore, we consider our estimates as
rather conservative.
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size and range from a high 9.1% in fabricated metal products to a low 1.0% in food, beverages,
and tobacco products. In other words, ﬁrms in the fabricated metal (food) industry supply
to industries in which the average share of foreign equity held is 9.1% (1.0%). They have
the most (least) intense contact to multinational downstream enterprises. In contrast, forward
linkages are highest in the rubber and plastics product industry (5.6%) implying that these ﬁrms
very intensively consume inputs from multinational upstream enterprises. Very low contact to
multinational upstream ﬁrms can be observed in the coke and petrol industry (0.3%).
Table 3: Summary statistics on FDI spillovers by industry in 2010
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96.010.158.746.3occabot,segareveb,dooF61,51C
C17,18,19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 1.27 2.22 1.83 1.64
C23 Coke, reﬁned petroleum products and nuclear fuel 11.19 1.07 1.90 0.31
37.052.233.1194.6stcudorplacimehcdnaslacimehC42C
95.589.687.606.4stcudorpscitsalpdnarebbuR52C
51.102.189.786.8stcudorplarenimcillatem-nonrehtO62C
80.142.846.430.2slatemcisaB72C
C28 Fabricated metal products, exc. machinery and equipment 3.85 6.62 9.06 3.49
62.377.541.5113.31.c.e.ntnempiuqednayrenihcaM92C
C30,32,33 Oﬃce, accounting and computing machinery; Radio, television
and communication equipment; Medical, precision and optical
instruments 9.42 23.42 2.73 3.95
00.443.570.4283.8tnempiuqelacirtcelE13C
10.444.178.0465.43sreliart-imesdnasreliart,selcihevrotoM43C
80.431.262.3132.7tnempiuqetropsnartrehtO53C
69.273.355.097.1gnilcycer;c.e.ngnirutcafunaM73,63C
The code in column 1 corresponds to the classiﬁcation in the input-output database of the OECD. The industries
C30, C32, and C33 are combined in to one industry since they correspond to one ISIC Rev.4 industry at the
2-digit level.The industries C20 and C21, 22 are not represented in our database.
3.3 Product sophistication
To determine the sophistication level of products, we adapt the product-speciﬁc sophistication
index from Hausmann et al. (2007).10 The index measures the average implied technology
level of a product k which is proxied by the weighted average GDP per capita of those coun-
tries that export product k. The weights reﬂect the revealed comparative advantage that each
country has in product k. A product is associated with a higher (lower) sophistication level if
on average richer (poorer) countries have a revealed comparative advantage in the product. Put
differently, the index represents the technology requirements that a country must meet in order
to successfully export the product. The level of sophistication of product k is deﬁned as
10 The sophistication index in Hausmann et al. (2007) is called PRODY and has been used by Jarreau and Poncet
(2012) and Harding and Javorcik (2011), for example.
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SOPHk =
∑
i
(
xki /Xi∑
i (x
k
i /Xi)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
weight ϕki
Yi, (4)
where Yi is the GDP per capita of country i. xki denotes country i’s export volume of product
k, and Xi is the total export volume of country i. The weights ϕki are variants of Balassa’s
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) Index and add up to one. The weights ensure that the
sophistication ordering of the products is not biased by country size.11 Data on GDP per capita
in constant 2005 USD stem from the World Development Indicators database. Data on product-
level exports come from the CEPII-BACI database which is constructed from UN-Comtrade
data. We use disaggregated export data at the 3-digit SITC Rev.3 level which comprises 259
product categories. To get a time consistent indicator, we take the average level of GDP per
capita and exports by each country over the time span of 2000 to 2010. This diminishes disturb-
ing inﬂuences from wars and business cycle ﬂuctuations, as well as industrial and technological
developments over time. Consistent data on GDP per capita and the corresponding export ﬂows
are available for 175 countries. Table 4 provides the three most and least sophisticated prod-
ucts according to SOPHk. The top sophisticated product is organo-inorganic compounds with
an average sophistication level of 26,309 USD. Organo-inorganic compounds are intensively
exported by Ireland, for example. In contrast, the least sophisticated product is uranium ores
with an average sophistication level of 976 USD. Uranium ores make up a substantial share of
Nigerian exports, one of the world’s poorest countries.
Table 4: Top and bottom sophisticated products
Top products
SITC code SOPH in USD Description
515 26,309 Organo-inorganic compounds, heterocyclic compounds, nucleic acids and their
salts, and sulphonamides
344 26,049 Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons, n.e.s.
514 23,356 Nitrogen-function compounds
Bottom products
SITC code SOPH in USD Description
286 976 Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates
284 1,103 Nickel ores and concentrates; nickel mattes, nickel oxide sinters and other
intermediate products of nickel metallurgy
264 1,357 Jute and other textile bast ﬁbres, n.e.s., raw or processed but not spun; tow
and waste of these ﬁbres (including yarn waste and garnetted stock)
SITC categories are deﬁned at the Rev.3 3-digit level.
11 Assume for example that both the US and Ecuador export bananas. Since the US is larger in market size than
Ecuador, its export volume of bananas is probably larger than that of Ecuador. However, bananas certainly take a
larger share in Ecuador’s exports than in the US exports. Not controlling for a country’s RCA in exporting bananas
might thus lead to a higher sophistication level for bananas simply because they are exported (to a small extent) by
a rich country.
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We use the index to determine the sophistication level of the products manufactured by the
Indian ﬁrms. The product classiﬁcation of CMIE cannot directly be linked to any standard
international classiﬁcation. Therefore, we reclassify all products according to the SITC 3-digit
classiﬁcation. We manage to identify 82% of all ﬁrm-product-year observations which account
for 88% of total output. For the remaining share, the information provided on the products
is not sufﬁcient in order to assign a sophistication level. We also experimented with a more
disaggregated classiﬁcation at the 4- and 5-digit level. However, as products become more
disaggregated the reclassiﬁcation becomes more imprecise and we managed to identify less
than half of all observations. Although the 3-digit level is comparatively aggregate, we are
conﬁdent that the 259 different product categories still provide sufﬁcient scope for variation in
the activities of ﬁrms. A more detailed description of the product reclassiﬁcation to SITC Rev.3,
3-digit, can be found in the appendix.
13
IOS Working Paper No. 340
4 Portrait of product sophistication in India
In this section, we describe the economic prevalence of product sophistication of Indian ﬁrms.
To capture different dimensions of product sophistication at the ﬁrm-level, we employ two
measures. The ﬁrst is a dummy variable HSP indicating whether a ﬁrm produces a highly
sophisticated product. HSP is equal to 1 if a ﬁrm produces at least one product that belongs
to the top quartile of the sophistication distribution. This allows us to capture ﬁrms’ manufac-
turing of the most sophisticated products. Second, we calculate, EXSit, the extent of product
sophistication per ﬁrm:
EXSit =
K∑
k
Saleskit∑K
k Sales
k
it
SOPHk. (5)
EXS is deﬁned as the average sophistication level of all products, k = 1, ...K, that are pro-
duced by a ﬁrm. The sophistication level SOPHk of each product k is weighted by its share
in total ﬁrm sales. A higher value of EXSit indicates that the ﬁrm manufactures products with
a higher sophistication level or that a higher share of its sales stems from more sophisticated
products.
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(b) Share of HSP manufacturers
Figure 2: Product sophistication across industries, 2001–2010
We ﬁrst illustrate the industry-wise distribution of product sophistication in Figure 2. There
is substantial variation in EXS across different industries (Subﬁgure 2a). The lowest average
sophistication level per ﬁrm is found in food (USD 8,312) and textiles (USD 9,102), the high-
est average sophistication level is exhibited by ﬁrms in the chemicals industry (USD 15,779).
Subﬁgure 2b displays the share of ﬁrms that produce at least one HSP in each industry. HSP
manufacturers are present in each industry, but they are not homogeneously spread across in-
dustries. The share of HSP manufacturers ranges from about 5% in the textiles and furniture
industry to about 90% in the motor vehicles industry.
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Figure 3: Product sophistication and the share of output over time
Studying the evolvement of product sophistication over time, we also observe substantial
variation. Subﬁgure 3a displays the development of the average sophistication level of all prod-
ucts, weighted by the sales share, within our sample period. The average sophistication level of
products increased from USD 13,700 in 2001 to almost USD 14,000 in 2005. During the crisis
years, average product sophistication declined to about USD 13,800.
Since the manufacturing of very sophisticated products is associated with a higher growth
potential for developing countries (Hausmann et al., 2007), we shed more light on the produc-
tion of top sophisticated products by Indian ﬁrms. As Panel A of Table 5 shows, less than half
(43%) of all ﬁrms produce an HSP at least once over the entire sample period. Interestingly,
these ﬁrms together generate almost three quarters (74%) of total sample output and they also
produce on average a larger number of products than ﬁrms that never manufacture an HSP. Half
of all products produced by HSP manufacturers actually are HSPs, the other half is made up
of less sophisticated products. Although these ﬁrms dominate manufacturing output, less than
one third of their output stems from HSPs (Panel B of Table 5). The bulk of output is generated
from the sale of less sophisticated products. Hence, less than a quarter of total sample output is
derived from the sale of HSPs. This is also depicted in Subﬁgure 3b. The share of output that
is generated from HSPs increases from 21.7% in 2001 to about 23% in 2005 and then drops to
its starting level in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis. Generally, the manufacturing of HSPs
seems not only to be rather low but also very persistent over time. Panel C of Table 5 reports
the unconditional sample probabilities of adding and dropping an HSP. The unconditional sam-
ple probability of adding an HSP only, for example, is the number of ﬁrm-year observations
in which an HSP was added only (no simultaneous dropping of another HSP) divided by total
ﬁrm-year observations. Over the whole sample period, HSP adding was observed in 5% of all
observations whereas dropping an HSP (without adding another HSP) was observed in 2% of
all cases. The unconditional probability of doing both, adding and dropping HSPs is 0.3%. The
probability that ﬁrms that produce HSPs stick to their HSP mix is about 39%. These ﬁndings
clearly indicate that manufacturing HSPs is not yet very prevalent among Indian manufacturing
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ﬁrms. One explanation is the high uncertainty in the proﬁtability of these products. Since they
require the investment in unknown technologies and are attractive to emulators, only few ﬁrms
engage in their production. A further issue is that the demand for HSPs in India may still be
low. This could also explain why rather large ﬁrms produce HSPs: only ﬁrms that generate
sufﬁciently high returns from other activities can bear the risky investment because they can
better cover potential losses from HSPs by other income generating products.
Table 5: Prevalence of HSP manufacturing in India
Panel A: Output by HSP manufacturers vs. never-HSP manufacturers
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Panel B: Output of HSP manufacturers by product type
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In Panel A, a ﬁrm is classiﬁed as an HSP manufacturer if it produces at least one highly sophisticated product
at least once over the whole sample period. Never-HSP manufacturers are ﬁrms that never produce a highly
sophisticated product. Panel B splits product output of HSP manufacturers by product type. In Panel C,
unconditional probabilities of changes in ﬁrms’ HSP mix are reported.
We next explore whether producing more sophisticated products is related to certain ﬁrm
characteristics. In doing so, we run simple OLS regressions of the following type:
Charijst = a0 + byijst + at + aj + as + eijst. (6)
Charijst denotes the respective ﬁrm characteristic. yijst is one of our two measures of ﬁrm
product sophistication, either HSP or LogEXS. If we employ HSP as sophistication mea-
sure, the coefﬁcient b gives us the percentage differential in ﬁrm characteristics between HSP
manufacturers and non-HSP manufacturers. For LogEXS, b can be interpreted as the percent-
age difference in ﬁrm characteristics for a 1% difference in average product sophistication. In
addition, we control for time, industry, and state ﬁxed effects.
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The results in Panel A of Table 6 suggest the existence of HSP manufacturer premia: ﬁrms
that produce an HSP are distinctly different in almost all reported ﬁrm characteristics. They are
signiﬁcantly older (11%), larger in terms of sales (33%) and the wage bill (50%) and they are
more productive (31%). These ﬁndings are in line with the theoretical predictions by Bernard,
Redding, and Schott (2009) who derive that ﬁrms sort into the production of more complex
goods according to their productivity. We also observe that these ﬁrms have a signiﬁcantly
higher probability to export (10%) and they are more often foreign-owned (1%).12 In Panel B
of Table 6, we test whether differences in ﬁrm characteristics also exist with regard to average
product sophistication. We ﬁnd that except for the age of a ﬁrm, all differences are statistically
signiﬁcant. A b-coefﬁcient of 14% in row 4 of Panel B, e.g., signiﬁes that the productivity
premia for ﬁrms with a 1% higher level of average product sophistication is 14%.
Table 6: Differentials in ﬁrm characteristics according to product sophistication
Panel A: HSP manufacturers vs. non-HSP manufacturers (Soph. measure: HSP )
Firm characteristic b (se) R2 Obs.
832,6370.0)3800.0(***2111.0egAgoL
832,6370.0)5320.0(2033.0selaSgoL
832,6301.0)5220.0(6105.0llibegaWgoL
832,6350.0)6320.0(6413.0PFTgoL
832,6350.0)1300.0(9110.0denwOngieroF
832,6350.0)0362.0(3073.0)%(erahSngieroF
832,6390.0)2600.0(1890.0)%(.borPtropxE
Panel B: Average sophistication (Soph. measure: LogEXS)
Firm characteristic b (se) R2 Obs.
732,6370.0)3200.0(9200.0–egAgoL
732,6380.0)6800.0(3521.0selaSgoL
732,6390.0)1700.0(6790.0llibegaWgoL
732,6350.0)9900.0(0141.0PFTgoL
732,6350.0)6000.0(3500.0denwOngieroF
732,6350.0)4750.0(9693.0)%(erahSngieroF
732,6380.0)6100.0(6610.0)%(.borPtropxE
Panel A display results from regressing ﬁrm characteristics on HSP , time, industry, and state ﬁxed eﬀects.
Panel B displays results from regressing ﬁrm characteristics on LogEXS, time, industry, and state ﬁxed eﬀects.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at 0.01, 0.05, and
0.10 levels, respectively.
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
To summarize, we ﬁnd strong evidence that ﬁrms that manufacture more (or highly) sophis-
ticated products outperform less sophisticated ﬁrms. In addition, HSP manufacturers dominate
manufacturing output although the output by HSPs is rather low. This may be due to the higher
12 One might be concerned that our classiﬁcation of ﬁrms in HSP and non-HSP manufacturers simply reﬂects the
distinction between multi-product and single-product ﬁrms. Naturally, manufacturing an HSP and being a multi-
product ﬁrm is highly correlated since HSP manufacturers produce on average more than one product (Table 5).
However, in our data more than half of all ﬁrms that never produce an HSP sell more than one product and are thus
multi-product ﬁrms. Therefore, we are conﬁdent that we do not simply capture multi-product ﬁrm characteristics
when classifying ﬁrms according to the sophistication of their activities.
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costs and uncertainty associated with producing more complex products. In the following, we
analyze whether contact to MNEs can foster the manufacturing of more sophisticated products
by ﬁrms via spillovers through horizontal and vertical linkages.
18
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5 The impact of FDI spillovers on product sophistication
To examine the relationship between product sophistication and spillovers from FDI, we choose
two different approaches. In subsection 5.1, we ﬁrst use a binary model to estimate the effect of
horizontal and vertical spillovers on a ﬁrm’s decision whether to produce an HSP. In subsection
5.2, we then test for spillover effects on the extent of product sophistication using ﬁxed effect
estimation. The ﬁrst part of the analysis allows us to infer how the presence of MNEs affects
ﬁrms’ engagement in manufacturing products with the highest sophistication level. The second
part identiﬁes driving forces behind continuous changes in ﬁrm-product sophistication.
5.1 Manufacturing of HSPs
5.1.1 Estimation Strategy
To explore the relationship between spillovers and ﬁrms’ manufacturing of an HSP, we estimate
the following equation:
Prob(HSPijst = 1) = Φ(α0 + β1Horizontaljt + β2Backwardjt + β3Forwardjt
+ γ1LogTFPijst + γ2ForeignShareijst + γ3LogAgeijst
+ δHHIjt + αt + αj + αs). (7)
As deﬁned above, the dependent variable HSP is a binary indicator equal to 1 if ﬁrm i active
in industry j and operating in state s produces at least one product in year t that belongs to the
top quartile of the sophistication distribution. Horizontal, Backward, and Forward denote
our measures of FDI spillovers. Additionally, we control for ﬁrm-level inﬂuences such as the
share of equity held by foreigners in the ﬁrm (ForeignShare), the log age of a ﬁrm (LogAge),
and log total factor productivity (LogTFP ). We expect a positive inﬂuence of the ﬁrm-level
controls on the manufacturing of HSPs. Foreigners that possess a higher stake in a local ﬁrm
may have a higher incentive to share their technologies with the ﬁrm in order to produce a more
sophisticated output and to earn higher proﬁts. Older and more productive ﬁrms are better able
to cover the higher ﬁxed costs and to bear the higher risk of producing more complex products.
Additionally, we include the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl-Index HHI to control for industry concen-
tration. HHI is deﬁned as the sum of squared market shares of all ﬁrms operating in a particular
industry. A higher value indicates a higher level of concentration and thus weaker competition.
The effect of HHI on product sophistication is ambiguous: on the one hand, stronger concen-
tration generates larger proﬁts which can be reinvested in the production of more sophisticated
products. On the other hand, weaker competition can impede the manufacturing of HSPs since
incentives to innovate and produce very sophisticated products decrease.
Standard errors are clustered at the industry-year level because our key regressors vary at the
industry-year level (Moulton, 1990). Moreover, we include time, industry, and Indian state ﬁxed
effects. By including industry and state dummies, we rule out that the effect of our spillover
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measures on HSP manufacturing is driven by the presence of multinational enterprises in more
(or less) attractive industries and states. We abstain from including ﬁrm ﬁxed effects because
the within variation in our dependent variable is very low. As reported in Panel C of Table 5,
only few ﬁrms add and drop HSPs over time. We thus estimate equation (7) via a pooled probit
model for all observations between 2001 and 2010. In addition, we reestimate our baseline
speciﬁcation for domestically owned ﬁrms only since we expect spillovers to be particularly
important for ﬁrms without intra-ﬁrm access to foreign technologies. To identify domestically
owned ﬁrms, we use the ownership classiﬁcation provided by Prowess.
5.1.2 Results
Table 7 provides the results from estimating equation (7) for the full sample (column 1) and
the sample of domestically owned ﬁrms only (column 2). We report average marginal effects
instead of the parameter coefﬁcients since the latter are less informative in terms of magni-
tude. We ﬁnd a positive but statistically insigniﬁcant effect of Horizontal on the likelihood
of a ﬁrm to produce an HSP (column 1). Consequently, ﬁrms do not beneﬁt from the pres-
ence of MNEs within their own industry in terms of product sophistication. This contradicts
intra-industrial spillovers and hints at strong protection against technology leakage within an
industry. In contrast, the effect of Backward is positive and highly signiﬁcant: This provides
supportive evidence of positive vertical spillovers via supply chains. Speciﬁcally, an increase
by 10 percentage points in foreign presence in downstream industries raises the likelihood of
a ﬁrm to produce an HSP on average by 4%. Thus, while MNEs try to prevent spillovers to
competitors, they have an incentive to transfer their knowledge to upstream local suppliers in
order to receive highly sophisticated inputs. One concern is that the effect of Horizontal could
be ﬂawed due to measurement error. If vertical and horizontal linkages are identiﬁed at the
2-digit industrial level, vertical linkages at the 4-digit level are potentially misclassiﬁed as hor-
izontal linkages. This is the case if MNEs consume inputs from local suppliers that are located
in a different industry at the 4-digit level but in fact belong to the same 2-digit industry as the
multinational ﬁrm (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009). Since we observe a strong positive effect of
vertical backward FDI spillovers at the 2-digit level, we would actually expect the coefﬁcient
of Horizontal to be upward biased if the variable also covers vertical FDI at a more disaggre-
gated level. Therefore, the effect of Horizontal exclusive of vertical spillovers should be even
smaller which strongly denies a horizontal spillover channel.
Interestingly, the effect of Forward is negative and twice as large as the effect of backward
spillovers. Firms that consume from industries with a 10 percentage points higher foreign
presence have a 13% lower probability of manufacturing an HSP. At ﬁrst glance, this seems
counterintuitive given that access to better inputs from foreign ﬁrms is supposed to lead to
more sophisticated outputs (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). One explanation for the negative impact
of Forward is that intermediate inputs provided by multinational ﬁrms are probably not ﬁt
for use by local ﬁrms. If the technology gap between multinational ﬁrms and local Indian
ﬁrms is too large, Indian ﬁrms are not able to successfully transform more sophisticated inputs
20
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Table 7: Effect of FDI Spillovers on the Probability to Manufacture a HSP
)4()3()2()1(PSH
Probit  Probit  LPM  LPM
80000.082000.001000.072000.0latnoziroH
(0.00034)                    (0.00036)                    0.00040)                    (0.00042)
31400.072400.090400.0***42400.0drawkcaB
(0.00159)   (0.00173)   (0.00166)  (0.00175)
08310.043510.017110.0–01310.0–drawroF
(0.00438)   (0.00452)   (0.00492)  (0.00498)
01900.073900.029310.099310.0PFTgoL
(0.00208)   (0.00217)   (0.00299)  (0.00314)
92000.020000.091000.020000.0erahSngieroF
(0.00009)   (0.00030)   (0.00010)  (0.00032)
65030.034730.020230.078830.0egAgoL
(0.00345)   (0.00353)   (0.00312)  (0.00318)
00000.010000.000000.000000.0–IHH
(0.00002)   (0.00002)   (0.00002)  (0.00002)
LogTFP*Forward 0.00233**   0.00236**
(0.00100)  (0.00107)
240,43062,63220,43832,63snoitavresbO
SEYSEYSEYSEYEF-emiT
SEYSEYSEYSEYEF-etatS
SEYSEYSEYSEYEF-yrtsudnI
citsemoDsmrﬁllAcitsemoDsmrﬁllAelpmaS
Pseudo R2 0.253  0.252
R2 0.302  0.300
Columns 1and 2 provide average marginal eﬀects from a pooled probit model. Columns 3 and 4 provide the coeﬃcients from
a pooled linear probability model including the interaction between Forward and LogTFP. Time, industry, and state ﬁxed
eﬀects are included. Standard errors are clustered at the industry-year level. ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at 0.01, 0.05, and
0.10 levels, respectively. 
***
***
***
**
***
***
***
–
–
**
***
***
***
**
***
***
***
–
–
into more sophisticated outputs. The crowding-out effect is aggravated if intermediate inputs
from multinational ﬁrms replace other inputs. In that case, local Indian ﬁrms do not have
access to suitable inputs anymore and cease the production of sophisticated ﬁnal goods. A
second explanation for the negative impact of Forward is that MNEs strategically might try to
prevent local ﬁrms from accessing their inputs: MNEs that have offshored intermediate stages
of production to an Indian ﬁrm in order to access inputs at a lower cost may induce the Indian
ﬁrm to charge a mark-up for its input to local competitors.13
The average marginal effect of ForeignShare is positive as expected but insigniﬁcant. The
weak inﬂuence of foreign intra-ﬁrm presence is counterintuitive but could be due to the presence
of cost-saving FDI motives. Foreign investors that have cost-saving motives in mind invest
abroad in order to produce less sophisticated, intermediate products at a lower cost which are
then exported back to the home country of the investor. This could reduce the positive effects
that are usually associated with foreign presence within a ﬁrm. Cost-saving motives of FDI do
not contradict positive backward spillovers, though. A downstream multinational textile ﬁrm
still requires highly sophisticated textile machines from local suppliers even though it produces
a less sophisticated output (e.g. t-shirts). The other ﬁrm-level covariates have the expected
13 See e.g. Bartels, Buckley, and Mariano (2009) and Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) for a description on
strategic ﬁrm behaviour in complex, global production systems.
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effect on HSP manufacturing: older and more productive ﬁrms are more likely to produce an
HSP. For example, an increase in LogTFP by 10% increases a ﬁrm’s probability to produce
an HSP by 14%. A higher industry concentration is associated with a lower probability of
manufacturing an HSP, but the effect is not signiﬁcantly different from zero.
Comparing the results for all ﬁrms and domestic ﬁrms only (column 2), we ﬁnd that the
marginal effects are very similar in magnitude. This ﬁnding supports our guess that spillover
effects seem to be mainly driven by domestically owned ﬁrms which should react more strongly
to the presence of MNEs.
In columns 3 and 4, we include an interaction term between Forward and LogTFP to test
whether spillovers through forward linkages depend on a ﬁrm’s productivity level. As Carluccio
and Fally (2013) argue, more productive ﬁrms are better able to adopt foreign inputs into their
production process and are thus less harmed by the presence of multinational ﬁrms. In order to
interpret the interaction term, we neglect the binary nature of our dependent variable and use a
linear probability model instead. The interaction term is indeed positive and highly signiﬁcant
whereas the base effect of Forward remains negative. This supports the notion that the effect
of access to foreign inputs depends on a ﬁrm’s productivity level. The more productive the ﬁrm,
the less it is affected by the technology gap to foreign multinationals. In terms of magnitude,
the positive effect from a 1% increase in productivity outweighs the negative impact of a 1 per-
centage point higher presence of multinational suppliers. Thus, very productive ﬁrms actually
beneﬁt from access to inputs from multinational upstream ﬁrms.
5.2 Extent of Product Sophistication
5.2.1 Estimation Strategy
By classifying ﬁrms into HSP and non-HSP manufacturers, we face two limitations. First,
we do not observe continuous sophistication upgrades by ﬁrms. FDI and its spillover effects
may not only induce ﬁrms to produce one product of the top of the sophistication distribution,
but also to gradually upgrade their production from less to more sophisticated products. As
Goldberg et al. (2010) note, product churning in India is lower than in other countries, probably
due to industrial licensing and rigid labor market regulations. This, however, does not prevent
ﬁrms from adjusting the sales share of their product mix. Therefore, we expect to see more
variation in the average sophistication level of all products a ﬁrm produces. Second, in the
above analysis we could not control for unobserved factors that could drive both the decision of
a ﬁrm whether to produce an HSP and the location decision of foreign investors, such as ﬁrm
speciﬁc effects. The effect of Backward, e.g., is upward biased if multinational ﬁrms decide
to locate in industries which predominantly consume from ﬁrms that have a high management
quality and thus produce more sophisticated products. To take both concerns into account, we
test for spillover effects on gradual sophistication upgrading (LogEXSit) and control for ﬁrm
ﬁxed effects (αi):
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LogEXSijst =α0 + β1Horizontaljt + β2Backwardjt + β3Forwardjt + γ1LogTFPijst
+ γ2ForeignShareijst + γ3LogAgeijst
+ δHHIjt + αt + αi + ijst. (8)
Another concern is that idiosyncratic shocks can stimulate a ﬁrm’s capability to manufacture
more sophisticated products. If multinationals tend to locate close to ﬁrms experiencing such
a shock in order to gain access to better inputs or to realize increased selling opportunities, the
effects of our spillover measures are also biased. However, it is unlikely that multinationals
are able to react to short term shocks experienced by Indian ﬁrms given that foreign investment
usually involves tedious preparation and high transaction costs and fees (Blalock and Gertler,
2008). To take the within-industry correlation into account, we estimate all speciﬁcations with
industry-time clustered standard errors (Moulton, 1990).14
5.2.2 Results
Table 8 reports the corresponding results from estimating equation (8). In line with our previous
results, we ﬁnd that backward linkages strongly foster the manufacturing of more sophisticated
products. An increase in the presence of multinational downstream ﬁrms by 1 percentage points
increases the average product sophistication level of a ﬁrm by 1,6% (columns 1 and 2). Like-
wise, a higher presence of multinational suppliers, Forward, induces a signiﬁcantly negative
effect on average product sophistication. A 1 percentage point increase in upstream foreign
presence reduces average ﬁrm product sophistication in downstream industries by 3,2–3,6%.
As before, there is no evidence for intra-industry spillovers. Moreover, we conﬁrm that more
productive ﬁrms manufacture more sophisticated products on average. A 1% increase in ﬁrm
productivity leads on average to a 13% rise in ﬁrm product sophistication. In contrast to the
results above, we do not observe a heterogenous effect for more productive ﬁrms. The inter-
action term between LogTFP and Forward is positive but insigniﬁcant (columns 3 and 4).
Surprisingly, the estimated coefﬁcient of LogAge turns negative. Albeit the probability of pro-
ducing an HSP is higher for older ﬁrms, it is predominantly younger ﬁrms that have a higher
sophistication level on average. As above, the extent of industry concentration does not affect
product sophistication.
In addition, we apply a model in ﬁrst and second differences as a robustness check. The
ﬁxed-effects approach is more efﬁcient under the assumption that the idiosyncratic errors ijst
are serially uncorrelated, while the differences approach is more efﬁcient when ijst follows a
random walk. We follow Haskel et al. (2007) and additioanlly include industry, and state ﬁxed
effects (αj +αs). Industry and state ﬁxed effects account for a different average level of product
sophistication across industries. This allows us to control for the fact that foreign investors gra-
14 We also experimented with block-bootstrap techniques (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller, 2008). The results do
not differ signiﬁcantly.
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vitate towards industries that are supplied by or sell to industries with an increasing level of
product sophistication. The identiﬁcation of β1 to β3 then comes from the deviation of within-
industry changes in spillovers from the respective year and industry means.
The results stay qualitatively the same. Backward induces a highly signiﬁcant and positive
effect on the average product sophistication of a ﬁrm. The magnitude of the effect increases
slightly to 2,1–2,3% for the full sample of ﬁrms (columns 5 and 7) and 1,8–1,9% for the sam-
ple of domestic ﬁrms (columns 6 and 8). A notable difference to our previous results is the
highly signiﬁcant and negative effect of Horizontal when applying the model in second dif-
ferences (columns 7 and 8). Consequently, if we allow for a longer time horizon we observe
that ﬁrms in industries with a high presence of multinational investors produce on average less
sophisticated products than ﬁrms in industries with a lower presence. This result clearly points
to within-industry crowding out effects by competition from multinational companies. Since
multinational ﬁrms usually tend to be not only more skill-intensive but also more productive,
they crowd out less efﬁcient Indian ﬁrms which are prevented from product upgrading. A sec-
ond difference is that the signiﬁcant negative effect of vertical forward linkages vanishes.
Summing up, our ﬁndings provide evidence of strong spillovers between local ﬁrms and
MNEs through vertical backward linkages. Contact to multinational downstream ﬁrms enables
Indian ﬁrms to produce a top sophisticated product and it also fosters gradual sophistication up-
grading. In contrast, contact to multinational suppliers negatively affects the manufacturing of
top / more sophisticated products but the results are less robust across different speciﬁcations.
We do not ﬁnd evidence of positive spillover effects through horizontal linkages. If we allow
for a longer time horizon, intra-industry presence of MNEs prevents ﬁrms from producing more
sophisticated products.
5.2.3 Robustness Checks
We next perform a series of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our main results. In do-
ing so, we rely on our prefered speciﬁcation including ﬁrm ﬁxed effects (column 1 in Table 8).
The ﬁrst set of robustness checks considers the measurement of product sophistication via the
sophistication index by Hausmann et al. (2007). Recall that SOPH is a time constant measure
of product sophistication since we employ time-averaged values of GDP per capita and export
shares for each country. This is a rather conservative approach since it reduces the variation
in our dependent variable LogEXS. Changes in ﬁrm product sophistication can only stem
from a reallocation in the ﬁrm’s product mix and not from a change in sophistication ranking
of products over time. If e.g. a productivity shock allows poorer countries to produce more so-
phisticated products, the sophistication ranking would change. Likewise, the ranking changes
if poorer countries become richer due to the production of more sophisticated products. To test
whether our results are robust to a time-varying sophistication ranking, we calculate three dif-
ferent versions of SOPH . Version 1 is most ﬂexible in the sense that both the GDP per capita
levels and country-wise export shares vary over time. In version 2, GDP per capita varies but
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export shares are kept constant and vice versa in version 3. Table 9, columns 1 to 3 provide
the corresponding results for each version. Brieﬂy, we ﬁnd that our main results are robust to
different measurements of SOPH .
Since the use of the sophistication index by Hausmann et al. (2007) may seem rather re-
strictive, we additionally calculate product sophistication using the sophistication index SI de-
veloped by Lall, Weiss, and Zhang (2006). The basic concept of SI is similar to Hausmann
et al. (2007) since the sophistication level of a product is also derived from the income of its
exporters. It differs in the sense that it divides countries into 10 income groups according to
their GDP per capita and then uses the average GDP per capita and the average export share
of each income group to calculate SI .15 This has the advantage that outlier countries receive
less weight in the calculation of the index. The results, shown in column 4 of table 9, remain
basically unchanged.
The second set of robustness check regards the calculation of our spillover measures. Horiz-
ontal, Backward, and Forward hinge on the deﬁnition of the share of equity held by foreign
investors. Since information on the foreign equity share is available for publicly listed ﬁrms
only, we assume that ﬁrms denoted as Indian owned by Prowess have a foreign equity share of
0% and ﬁrms classiﬁed as foreign-owned are foreign-owned by 100%. To test the restrictiveness
of this assumption, we vary ownership thresholds and calculate alternative spillover measures.
In the ﬁrst version, we assume that ﬁrms that are denoted to be foreign-owned are foreign-
owned by 50% instead of 100%. In the second version, we set this threshold to 10%. Finally
in version 3, we only use the information on foreign equity shares of publicly listed ﬁrms. The
three linkage variables thus exclusively capture spillovers from publicly listed multinationals.
Note that in this version, we do not include the equity share of foreign owners as a control
variable since we would lose all observations from unlisted ﬁrms. The results are displayed in
Table 9 columns 5–7. The point estimates of our spillover variables change only slightly when
we alter the method of calculating the spillover measures. However, the estimates become less
signiﬁcant since the precision of the estimates decreases (columns 6 and 7). In column 7, e.g.,
the variation in the spillover variables is smallest since we only use information from the subset
of publicly listed ﬁrms to calculate the spillover variables.
Thirdly, we check whether the recent global ﬁnancial crisis impacts our results. In column 8
of Table 9, we only consider the years from 2001 to 2007 predeceeding the great downturn in
GDP and trade. Again, the resulting point estimates do not differ much.
Fourthly, we control for downstream demand of intermediate inputs as suggested by Javorcik
(2004). A higher presence of multinational downstream ﬁrms can lead to a stronger demand for
intermediate inputs supplied by an industry which would be captured inBackward and ﬂaw the
effect of supply chain linkages. We therefore include Demandjt which captures the demand of
15 For a more detailed description of how the index is calculated, please refer to Lall et al. (2006).
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downstream industries for intermediate inputs supplied by industry j in each year.16 As column
9 in Table 9 shows, backward spillovers are not driven by pure demand effects.
Fifthly, in addition to the downstream demand of intermediate inputs in column 9, we consider
the ﬁnancial situation of a ﬁrm (LiqRatio). We expect more liquid ﬁrms to produce more
sophisticated products on average since they can better cover higher investment costs. We thus
re-estimate our main speciﬁcation controlling for the liquidity ratio of the ﬁrm. LiqRatio is
deﬁned as the ratio of current assets less current liabilities over total assets. Since we are
worried that reverse causality may run from product sophistication to the ﬁnancial situation, we
include the variable lagged by one period in order to mitigate this problem. Results reveal that
controlling for this effect does not greatly change our main ﬁndings (column 10).
Sixthly, the effect of spillovers on product sophistication might be driven by certain groups of
ﬁrms, e.g. ﬁrms in the coke and petroleum industry. Due to the construction of the index, prod-
ucts belonging to this industry tend to receive a high sophistication level since petrol exporting
countries tend to have a high GDP per capita. However, this does not necessarily reﬂect a high
product technology or sophistication level but is simply endowment-driven. If multinationals
tend to locate in India in order to beneﬁt from cheaper access to petrol from Indian suppliers,
the positive effect of Backward would not only reﬂect knowledge spillovers, but also cost sav-
ing motives. To rule this out, we re-estimate our main speciﬁcation excluding ﬁrms belonging
to the petrol and coke industry. As suggested in column 11 of table 9, our results are basically
unchanged in terms of magnitude and signiﬁcance when excluding petrol and coke producing
ﬁrms.
Finally, Blalock and Gertler (2008) raise the concern that spillover effects could be mainly
driven by exporting ﬁrms. Multinational ﬁrms probably tend to choose local suppliers that also
sell their products to foreign markets assuming that this reﬂects a higher quality of the goods
sold by these ﬁrms. Firms that have access to export markets are also more likely to invest in
the production of more sophisticated products since they beneﬁt from larger sales opportunities.
In order to rule out bias from exporting ﬁrms, we re-estimate our main speciﬁcation with non-
exporting ﬁrms only. As non-exporting ﬁrms, we consider those that sell less than 10% of their
sales abroad. Column 12 conﬁrms that our main results hold. We observe a slightly stronger
effect of spillovers through supply chain linkages which is plausible since ﬁrms without contact
to international markets should beneﬁt in particular from the presence of foreign knowledge. In
addition to the speciﬁcations of Table 9, we ran all regressions with domestic ﬁrms only. The
results are robust and not displayed here, but are available upon request.
16 Demandjt for inputs from industry j in time t is calculated as the sum of input requirements of downstream
industries k: Demandjt =
∑
k ajkYkt, where ajk gives the number of units from input j that are needed in order
to produce one unit of downstream good k. ajk is taken out of the input-output tables. Ykt denotes the output of
industry k.
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5.2.4 Comparative Statics
Our results suggest that the effect of FDI spillovers on average product sophistication strongly
depends on the channel through which spillovers are transmitted. Even though the presence of
MNEs generates a positive spillover effect to upstream industries it can also entail a negative
crowding out effect to downstream ﬁrms. This leads to the question in which industries the
attraction of FDI is most beneﬁcial. Intuitively, this are downstream industries which create
strong backward linkages that compensate for negative vertical forward effects from multina-
tional suppliers in upstream industries. To identify industries of this type, we perform a com-
parative statics analysis in the following four-step-procedure. We ﬁrst calculate the predicted
values of ﬁrm product sophistication in one speciﬁc year, t = 2010, using the regression spec-
iﬁcation in column 1, Table 8. These values serve as our benchmark, LoĝEXS
base
ij2010. We then
artiﬁcially increase ForeignShare, the foreign equity share, of all ﬁrms in one particular in-
dustry l by 10 percentage points in t = 2010. This leads to a change in the three spillover
variables Horizontalj2010, Backwardj2010, and Forwardj2010 which we recalculate. Next, we
calculate LoĝEXS
counter
ij2010 , the predicted change in ﬁrm product sophistication due to the change
in foreign presence. To do so, we use the new levels of our spillover variables and the coefﬁ-
cients from column 1, Table 8. Finally, we determine for all industries the net change in product
sophistication that stems from a change in industry l:
ΔLoĝEXSj2010 = (LoĝEXS
counter
ij2010 − LoĝEXS
base
ij2010) · 100. (9)
ΔLoĝEXSj2010 takes the same value for all ﬁrms in industry j since we increase FDI in all
ﬁrms equally in industry l. These four steps are then iterated for each industry.
Column 1 of Table 10, reports ΔLoĝEXSlj2010, the predicted net change in product sophis-
tication in each industry j that results from a 10 percentage points increase in FDI in industry
l = 1 (basic metals). An estimate of –10.7 (column 1, row 3) implies that an increase in
FDI by 10 percentage points in the basic metals industry leads to a 10.7% decrease in ﬁrm
product sophistication in the machinery industry. On the diagonal, the within-industry changes
are displayed. A 10 percentage points increase in FDI leads to a 1.82% decrease in product
sophistication within the same industry. This is a composite effect of the horizontal spillover
(βˆ1 = −0.0024, Table 8 column 1) and the ﬁrms’ foreign equity share (γˆ3 = 0.0006). Generally,
an increase of FDI in more downstream industries, like e.g. the motor vehicles and transport
equipment industries, leads to an increase of ﬁrm product sophistication in almost all other in-
dustries. Increasing FDI in more upstream industries like basic metals and plastics slows down
product sophistication growth in almost all industries.
This comparative static can be seen as an exercise and visualization of how to detect indus-
tries wherein the presence of MNEs works best for the technological upgrading of a country.
However, in order to derive clear policy advice, a more complex general equilibrium model
would have to be calibrated which is beyond the scope of this analysis.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that knowledge spillovers from MNE to local ﬁrms can greatly
impact on product sophistication in India. Local ﬁrms beneﬁt the most from contact to multi-
national customers since downstream ﬁrms have a higher incentive to transfer their knowledge
and technologies to upstream suppliers than to rivals in the same industry. In contrast, a higher
presence of multinational upstream ﬁrms can lead to a crowding out effect so that less ﬁrms
manufacture top sophisticated products in downstream industries. Indian ﬁrms are probably not
able to integrate inputs from MNE into their production process and are driven out of the pro-
duction of more sophisticated ﬁnal goods. Therefore, policies should aim at attracting multina-
tional downstream ﬁrms in order to foster the structural transformation process from producing
less to more sophisticated products.
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Appendix
Following Grifﬁth et al. (2009), the level of LogTFP can be calculated as:
LogTFPit = Log(Yit/Y j)−
Z∑
z=1
σzi Log(x
z
it/x
z
j),
where i, j, and t are ﬁrm-, industry-, and time-speciﬁc subscripts. Yit is the output of ﬁrm i
in year t in form of total sales and Y j is the corresponding geometric mean in industry j. xzit
denotes the use of factor z. We consider three factors of production, labor, capital, and material
input costs. Labour input is measure by the total wage bill, capital by gross ﬁxed assets, and
material input costs by raw material expenditures. xzj captures the industry-wise geometric
mean of each factor. σzi = (α
z
i + α
z
j)/2, where α
z
i is the share of the factor z in output. σ
z
i
captures the average of the factor share in each ﬁrm i and the geometric mean factor share of
the corresponding industry j. Similarly, total factor productivity growth ΔLogTFPit is given
by
ΔLogTFPit = ΔLogYit −
Z∑
z=1
α˜zitΔLog(x
z
it),
where α˜zit = (α
z
it + α
z
it−1)/2. The superlative index number approach assumes constant returns
to scale which requires
∑
z σ
z
i = 1 and
∑
z α˜
z
it = 1.
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Description of the product classification
CMIE product code Name of products 3-digit  SITC description
14040501000000000000 Conveyor systems 744 Mechanical handling
,tnempiuqesroyevnoC
Crusher Feed Conveyor and parts thereof,
Discharge Conveyor n.e.s.
6990708010000000000 Fishing net 657 Special yarns,
elitxetlaicepstenhsiF
Fish Knitted Fabrics fabrics and
Fishnet Fabrics related products
Table A.2: Example of reclassification from CMIE codes to SITC categories
In the database, product names as reported by the firms are assigned a 20-digit code based on
an internal classification system by CMIE. In fact, one product code is usually linked to several
different product names in the database. We first standardize product names according to their
internal code. Since we are only interested in the products a firm actually manufactures, we
delete product codes that refer to retail trading activities, rental income and other services per-
formed. In doing so, we eliminate 316 different products. We next allocate each product code
to the corresponding SITC 3-digit category in order to determine the sophistication level of a
product. This task was performed manually by a research assistant. We double checked the re-
classification and sorted out inconsistencies. Table A.2 provides an example of the concordance
between the 20-digit internal code and the SITC Rev.3 classification. Product names often dif-
fer in spelling (Fishing net vs. Fish net) or are more or less precise (Conveyors vs. Discharge
Conveyor). We manage to classify 82% of all firm-product-year observations in our subsample
at the 3-digit level. These account for 88% of total product output. For the remaining share
of 12% of total output, we cannot determine the corresponding concordance because sufficient
information on the type of the product is not available. Assigning products to the 4- or 5-digit
level would certainly be more satisfactory and better reflect single products compared to a more
aggregate classification. However, given that we only observe the often rather uninformative
names of the products, this is infeasible without sacrificing the precision of our concordance.
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